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Abstract: In order to emerge as a regional leader and an influential global power, India has been expanding its role as a donor or 
development partner across South Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries. To cash on its identity of the Big Brother of South Asia 
India, despite having some serious domestic and regional problems, recently invested a lot of money in a number of development 
projects in neighbouring countries. This article attempts to delve into India’s role as an emerging power in South Asian development 
business. With a view to examine India’s prospect in this context, the article analyzes three pertinent development cases from three 
major South Asian countries namely Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka where India attempted to prove its regional development 
leadership through bilateral arrangements. After reviewing those cases, the author argues that India is still holding its image rather as a 
political Big Brother of South Asia with occasional attempts to interfere into the internal matters of its neighbours. In spite of some big 
joint development ventures in recent years, India in all three cases, failed to formulate trust and credibility among the people living in 
neighbouring countries. It also could not build an image of a regional development partner. This image crisis is one of the key reasons 
why it is very unlikely that India will soon become a regional or global super power especially in the light of increasing Chinese 
influence in the region. 
 
Keywords: India, Big Brother, Emerging Power in Development, South Asia, People’s Perception 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Despite some serious domestic and regional problems and 
issues India has been emerging as a global power for a long 
time (Sarma, 2010). Both Wulf (2013) and Bhasin (2008) 
identified that the Big Brother role of India in the South 
Asian region has drawn ample attention and criticisms from 
inside and outside the country. Many have also questioned 
India’s capacity to compete in the global politics and 
economy (Ambrose, 2012; Biswas, 2012). India does not 
seem to pay much attention to the criticism; rather it looks 
determined to demonstrate its leadership in South Asia as 
well as to grow as an influential global power in near future. 
What conforms that endeavour is that India is expanding its 
role as a donor or development partner not only among its 
neighbouring countries, but also in other developing parts of 
the world including Sub-Saharan Africa (Manning, 2016). 
India, although still receives the biggest amount of 
development aid among the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa) countries, has emerged as a donor 
primarily to boost its influence over global policy and 
governance. I am interested in looking into India’s role in 
South Asia within this context of its rise as a global and 
regional development partner and donor.  
 
As a student of Governance and Development, I want to 
examine the donor role that India plays in its neighbouring 
countries including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and 
Bhutan through the lens of political economy, especially in 
regards to the ideas and interests (Hall, 1997) along with 
perceptions. Although India is investing a great deal of 
money in the form of joint venture development projects as 
well as grants and donations in neighbouring countries, it 
has not put much of its efforts to gain public support in these 
countries. In this paper, I argue that due to this lack of effort 
in public diplomacy (Dahal, 2011; McDowell, 2008, p. 7) 
India’s current efforts are not contributing to building its 
image as a regional or super power. India is still holding its 
image as the Big Brother in the region which mostly projects 
its political domination over the neighbouring countries. I 
also argue that unless India finds a way to alter its image to 
become more as a development leader or humanitarian 
donor, it would be very unlikely that it could succeed in 
competing with other emerging powers mainly China in 
terms of achieving regional and global economic interests. 
 
In this paper, I present a few cases and my arguments in 
three major sections. In the first section, I discuss and focus 
on development cases from Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri 
Lanka. India has invested a lot of effort, interest and money 
in all three cases and I have deliberately chosen them as they 
have recently generated many issues and debates regarding 
the role of India in the region. The second section shall 
analyse the cases with the ideas, interests and the public 
perceptions behind India’s involvement in those cases to 
understand how they contribute towards building India’s 
image. Finally, I conclude with the argument of why the 
current development initiatives in these countries are very 
unlikely to deliver India’s interest of being an influential 
regional or global power. 
 
2. The Cases 
 
The Bangladesh Case: Rampal Power Plant 
The Rampal Power Plant is currently the most debated issue 
regarding development in Bangladesh. In 2010, the 
governments of Bangladesh and India signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that Bangladesh 
Power Development Board (BPDB) and the National 
Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) of India would jointly 
set up a coal-based thermal power plant in Bangladesh. This 
joint venture was named as the Bangladesh-India Friendship 
Power Company (BIFPC). Both parties agreed to complete 
the project on a 50:50 contract basis. Both parties agreed 
that the NTPC would set up and operate the plant while the 
states of Bangladesh and India would have the share of 30% 
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of the total budget and the NTPC would invest the other 
70%which is an amount of USD 1.5 billion in the form of 
bank loans (Begum, 2013). This was a big investment from 
India, and the Government of Bangladesh welcomed it not 
only for the fact that Bangladesh needed the power to 
continue its production and growth (Ethirajan, 2010), but 
also as a part of its political commitments (Asaf, 2008).   
 
The Government of Bangladesh proposed this 1320 
Megawatt power plant to be set up in around 1834 acres of 
land area called Rampal under the district of Bagerhat. This 
site is just 14 kilometres away from the largest mangrove 
forest of the world The Sundarbans that lies on the delta of 
the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers on the Bay of 
Bengal. Many environmentalists have opposed the idea of 
this power plant being situated so close to the Sundarbans. 
They argued that the plant does not meet the international 
guidelines of such coal-based power plant, and it poses a big 
threat to the environment of the area including the 
biodiversity and wildlife of the Sundarbans (Haque, 2013). 
A telegraph report also depicted that the proposed plant shall 
damage a huge livelihood for fish and human as the entire 
area of impact would be unsuitable for farming, jeopardising 
the significant amount of production of crops and fish 
(Salam and Wahiduzzaman, 2013). Many civil society 
organizations and activists started to protest against this 
plant and termed it as the project of deception and mass 
destruction (Muhammad, 2013). 
 
The Government of Bangladesh is still determined to set up 
the plant at Rampal. The silence of the Indian government in 
this issue has built a negative image among the common 
people of Bangladesh. The mistrust of people towards the 
current government and India is now pretty apparent. People 
have discovered the political interests of both parties here. 
Many have argued that this project shall mostly deliver the 
interests of Indian companies and a few businessmen while 
the people of Bangladesh shall be the losers (Ritu, 2013). 
India has clearly failed to gain public support through 
diplomacy in this development case. 
 
The Nepal Case: 2015 Nepal Blockade 
Since the last quarter of 2015, Nepal had suffered from the 
economic and humanitarian crisis for a long period, when 
India imposed an undeclared blockade on Nepal. 
Historically Nepal has been dependent on India in economic, 
social and political aspects. India has always been interested 
in the politics of Nepal for a long period, and in 2015 when 
Nepal agreed upon and passed its constitution, India was 
displeased about it (Majumder, 2015). According to India, 
the ongoing protests against the common border areas 
became so violent that India had no other way but to put a 
blockade in those areas. As a result, the fuel that Nepal, 
being a landlocked country used to import from and through 
India was stopped. Soon the country ran out of fuel.  
 
Nepal was struggling to develop its democracy since 2006. 
Eventually through a long struggle and movement, Nepal 
abolished the monarchy and established a democracy. In 
2015, all groups and political parties in the country 
supported the constitution (Dixit, 2015). When India 
blocked the fuel transport, the Nepali people protested 
against the Indian government on the roads in the Capital. It 
was a humanitarian case as Nepal was hit by a 7.8 
magnitude earthquake several months ago and the 
reconstructions were going on. A Guardian report (2015) 
noted that the Indian blockade was inhuman and beyond 
imaginations as the fuel-based public transports, health and 
emergency services were interrupted (Pattisson, 2015). The 
report also added United Nations’ concern that blockade was 
threatening the country’s future. 
 
It was not a straight forward development case, but the point 
is, India has been a major donor to Nepal. Firstly, India 
being involved in the domestic politics of Nepal had many 
times influenced the way of discussions regarding the 
democratization in Nepal (Thapa, 2008). Secondly, in the 
2015 earthquake India assisted Nepal with aid in the forms 
of money, transport and other assistances. India even created 
a joint fundraising campaign led by the president of ‘India 
Development and Relief Fund’1 to help the earthquake-
affected Nepal. In this background, the blockade turned 
down all the leadership roles of India in Nepal in two 
months. The people’s perception regarding India’s 
involvement in Nepal changed and eventually Nepal had to 
turn to China and Pakistan for fuel (Samarasinghe, 2015). 
 
India, in this case also, did not try to practice public 
diplomacy to win the public support from Nepal. India even 
denied an obvious blockade to Nepal (The Telegraph, 2015) 
which exposed India’s political interests within the country 
and in Nepal before the people of Nepal. India was rather 
supporting the interests of Maoists in Nepal (Bava, 2007, 
p.4), and was not pleased with the constitutional 
development. India failed to continue its leadership in this 
case. 
 
The Sri Lanka Case: Colombo Deep Sea Port and Sri 
Lankan Railway Project 
After 25 years of civil war against Tamil tigers, Sri Lanka 
stored peace in 2009 (Weaver and Chamberlain, 2009). 
Despite that long held bloody civil war, this small island 
country has surprisingly developed substantially. It is in fact, 
in most social and economic indicators including education 
and health, leading among the South Asian nations. After the 
end of civil war, many countries including China and India 
wanted to invest in Sri Lanka in order to utilize the immense 
potential of this island in expanding port business. 
 
India has had an interest in Sri Lankan politics for a long 
time and Indian peace keeping force stayed in Sri Lanka to 
help fight the Tamil tigers. After 2009, India hoped that it 
could continue its influence over Sri Lanka. India planned to 
take some mega development projects including USD 70 
million the Indian Railway project (Radhakrishnan, 2011). 
India wanted to utilize the sea port of Colombo as well but it 
did not happen as the Government of Sri Lanka decided to 
receive more investments for China. China offered to build 
an international airport and a deep sea port in Colombo and 
the Government was glad to accept the ‘best term’ from 
Chinese investors (BBC, 2010). In 2010, Sri Lanka opened 
the first part of deep sea port as part of Chinese assistance to 
rebuild infrastructure worth of USD 6 Billion (BBC, 2010).  
                                                          
1
 Please find more about it at http://www.idrf.org/tag/nepal-
donations/ 
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India reacted explicitly on the increasing Chinese 
investments in Sri Lanka. The Government of India, through 
a press note expressed its concern over the increasing 
influence over the region of South Asia (Bajaj, 2010). The 
concurrent maritime boundary dispute lately added fuel to 
the issue. The Indian Government welcomed the new 
President in January 2015 when Sirisena defeated Mahendra 
Rajapaksa. India asked the newly elected government to 
rethink the security strategy in the Indian Ocean. It was 
important to India as a lot of Indian liquefied energy 
supplies take place through and around the island (Taneja, 
2015). On one hand, India was still having a number of 
armies in the Northern part of Sri Lanka, and on the other 
hand, India was putting pressure on Sri Lanka not receiving 
any more investment from China for a deep sea port. It was 
a critical time for Sri Lanka, and the bilateral relationship 
with India was at a stake.  
 
Many argued that due to the federal structures of 
government in Sri Lanka, India has an influence over the 
Tamil-dominated province in South and North (Shiya, 
2015). Most Sri Lankans do not welcome this interference 
from India in their domestic affairs. Sri Lanka sees more 
opportunities with Chinese-funded projects than the Indian 
ones, but India does not want to lose their control over the 
Ocean against its traditional opponent and competitor, China 
(Sharma, 2015). In doing so, over the years, on these few 
development projects around and on the island of Sri Lanka, 
India has lost its credibility and acceptance among the Sri 
Lankans. India failed to create goodwill of a regional power 
in this case. 
 
3. The Analysis 
 
India’s Ideas, Interests and People’s Perceptions in South 
Asia 
The above cases depict the stories how India has lately 
involved in their neighbouring countries. India does not have 
friendly relations with Pakistan, but it has friendly effective 
relations with other countries in South Asia. After Narendra 
Modi came in power, he wanted to have healthy relations 
with its neighbours (Ani, 2014). It was not surprising as the 
foreign policy of India has been following the principle of 
‘friendship with all enmity with none’ (Sibal, 2012). At the 
same time, India had always tried to maintain its dominance 
over its neighbours especially through political influence 
(Ayoob, 1990, p.109). The neighbouring countries people 
most cases did not welcome India in their domestic affairs, 
although different governments have varied political 
interests with India (Buzan, 2002). 
 
Lately India emerged as a donor and development partner in 
the world development business. Neighbouring governments 
also found their benefits in cooperating with Indian 
investments and aid driven projects. That is why; Indian 
investment in public and private sectors in these countries 
has recent increased by margin (Sharma, 2015). The idea 
behind this change of foreign policy, despite so many 
domestic problems within the country (Sarma, 2010), is to 
earn public support with the region, and to deter the 
dominance and aggression of China. This was a good idea 
but it did not deliver the interests in most cases. As in the 
Bangladesh case, India made investment in the project in 
order to promote NTPC and their political interests with the 
government of Bangladesh. India was supporting the present 
Government of Bangladesh which has been suffering to gain 
legitimacy itself as the unfair and unopposed 2014 election 
led them to power (Ahmed, 2014). To add on that the 
current Awami League led government came into power 
through January 2014 election in which the main opposition 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party did not participate in the 
election, and only around 22% (which is official government 
information) voters turn out to vote. More significantly, 153 
electorates which are more than 50% of the total electorates 
of 300 were elected unopposed without any poll (Ahmed, 
2014). There are a few other important issues that India did 
not solve such as the river water share with Bangladesh. In 
addition to that, the environmental threats by the project did 
not much contribute to change people’s perception about 
India. 
 
India has treated Nepal as a province as the citizens of the 
two countries do not require visas to visit each other. The 
economy as well as the political development of Nepal was 
pretty much dependent on India. India could utilize this 
historical bilateral tie to its favor which it tried by offering 
increasingly more political and developmental aid in recent 
years. In the case of the blockade, India failed to depict 
humanity. Its role in the post-earthquake Nepal was 
condemned by the Nepali people as well as by the 
international community. In this case, India was struggling 
to manage its marginal ethnic groups residing at the borders 
areas adjacent to Nepal. The Indian idea of regional 
dominance, in this case, badly turned into a political interest. 
In the end, people held better perceptions about China.  
 
In the case of Sri Lanka, the main idea was to deter the 
dominance of China in the Indian Ocean. India contributed a 
lot in the domestic peace building in Sri Lanka, but the latest 
development projects like the railway and its concern about 
deep sea port clearly showed their interest to dominate over 
this region as a Big Brother, not as a humanitarian leader or 
donor. 
 
The interests of India which are to dominate their 
neighbours and to utilize the national governments to take 
control over the region were apparent in these cases. In 
terms of political economy, the winners were the national 
governments, as they received more and more aid within the 
competitive context between India and China. India did lose 
to a great extent as they could not win the public support 
although they invested a lot. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
India, as I mentioned before, is definitely emerging as a 
power in world development. The question is how far it can 
go. This depends on many domestic, regional and 
international factors. Being the largest country in South Asia 
as well as the biggest democracy (with the most number of 
elections) in the world, India is still struggling to hold its 
geographic integrity and peace. As Haan(2006) pointed out, 
India has been struggling with its immense inequality among 
its regions. Half of its population lives under the poverty line 
(Kumar, 2010). Still several areas are fighting for separation 
within country. Despite these major issues within the 
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country, India is still trying to emerge as a global donor. 
People in India and in the neighbouring countries do not find 
this idea logically sound.  
 
I analysed the above cases and showed how those kinds of 
cases where India is trying to invest in a development 
projects or trying to provide aid, are mostly failing to clarify 
its legitimacy as a donor. In most cases, people still perceive 
India’s interest of a dominating Big Brother power within 
the region. People do not have clear understanding what 
India can bring for them, if it emerges as a global power in 
future. India has developed a plan to connect its rivers 
within its territory which shall affect Bangladesh, and it has 
problem of maritime boundary with Sri Lanka. It is also 
fighting with Pakistan. These neighbouring countries have 
good ties with China and it is investing more and creating a 
much better image in the South Asian region (Brunjes, 
Levine, Palmer, and Smith, 2013).  
 
Although on the platform of BRICS, India and China are 
operating together and putting funds in the same 
development bank, they are competitors and have conflicting 
interests in South Asian region. The above cases and the 
analysis in the previous section show that India is still far 
behind to be able to create a good humanitarian or 
development partner image in its neighbouring countries. 
The image that India is now having which is of a more 
politically motivated and interest driven neighbour that 
always interferes in neighbouring countries internal matters 
embedded in the practices of regional cooperation as well as 
in the minds of people. People do not really trust India and 
do not see it as a super power in world development 
business. 
 
However, India may look to improve its image in this region 
by improving public diplomacy policies within the region. In 
doing so, it has challenges within itself. Considering all 
these factors and the current evidences that I observe and the 
cases I presented above, it seems very unlikely that India 
would become a big development partner or an influential 
global player of world development where the Chinese 
influence is rapidly increasing. 
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